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ABSTRACT. The hypothesis that different income groups have different willingness to pay for acces-
sibility to the city centre is based on the standard monocentric model. This hypothesis is empirically 
tested with accessibility attributes in a hedonic model of apartment prices in the suburbs of the city 
of Lyon, France. The conditions of residential segregation are described, and apartment prices in the 
poor and the rich suburbs are analysed with regression techniques. Travel times to two urban centres 
are accounted for, as well as centrality and accessibility integral indexes. We found that in the selected 
areas the hypothesis is true. Spatial differences between the estimates for accessibility measures are 
significant. In more socially problematic areas, the willingness to pay for better accessibility is higher.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Economic literature about urban segregation ex-
perienced rapid development since the first work 
of Kain (1968) on the difficulties of employment 
access for the inhabitants of American ghettos. 
Numerous case studies dealing with the question 
of neighbourhood effect test the impact of social 
polarisation or accessibility on unemployment, iso-
lation, crime or school results in problematic dis-
tricts of different cities and countries (Case, Katz 
1991; Hoxby 2000; Bayer et al. 2008; Galster et al. 
2008). 
In France, the economic studies of segregation 
are more recent and mainly dated by the years 
2000s (Fitoussi, Savidan 2003; Maurin 2004; 
Buisson, Mignot 2005). With several exceptions 
analysing geographic and ethnic origins (Pan Ké 
Shon 2010), this literature focuses on the socio-
economic dimensions to demonstrate the increas-
ing inequalities between rich and poor neighbour-
hoods and to measure their negative consequences 
on the economic, human and social capital of poor 
inhabitants, whose significant share is suffered 
from high unemployment (Bouabdallah et al. 2002; 
Choffel, Delattre 2003; Gaschet, Gaussier 2005; 
Gobillon, Selod 2004; Korsu, Wenglenski 2010). 
Most of these studies confirm the hypothesis that 
the unemployment of poor residents is partially 
caused by poor accessibility to jobs (especially to 
low-skilled jobs) and high poverty rates. The two 
main reasons of poor employment accessibility in 
the Paris region are location in remote neighbour-
hoods with few jobs and low car-ownership rate 
(Korsu, Wenglenski 2010). In their analysis of 
the Lyon, Marseille, and Lille urban agglomera-
tions, Mignot et al. (2009) highlight the point that 
though some recent studies report little inequal-
ity in daily mobility since households have access 
to cars, at the same time inequality increases for 
those without car. 
The growing interest of academic research to 
residential segregation in France can be explained 
by a complicated reality including violence and 
b
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urban riots, which needs to be adequately under-
stood before elaboration of a competent policy by 
decision-makers. The first urban riots in France 
took place in the eastern suburbs (banlieues) of 
Lyon: Vénissieux in 1981 and Vaulx-en-Velin in 
1990, while the last one happened in 2005 and 
called “the suburb crisis” touched many French 
cities. This situation has often been interpreted 
as a fiasco of the integration policy in neighbour-
hoods mainly populated by immigrants and their 
descendants. While French law prohibits collect-
ing statistical data on racial and religious prin-
ciples, some studies based on nationality of ori-
gin demonstrate that ethnic segregation is often 
superimposed with socio-economic segregation 
(Fitoussi, Savidan 2003). Focusing on life condi-
tions in the disadvantaged suburbs, Pan Ké Shon 
(2010) highlights the rise in ethnic segregation 
and simultaneous reduction in income segregation 
between two most recent censuses. While the so-
cially best-equipped residents, mainly French na-
tionals, leave problematic neighbourhoods, most of 
the younger arrivals, who are North Africans and 
Black Africans, have “poor social characteristics” 
(Pan Ké Shon 2010). However, he rejects the idea 
that the high concentration of immigrants is the 
result of self-segregation, because what is observed 
is not a “White flight”, but rather “all run” (Pan Ké 
Shon 2009). Not taking into account discrimina-
tion, which is difficult to quantify, the problems of 
the banlieue population are mainly socio-economic, 
such as the access to housing market and employ-
ment market under the constraints of income, 
housing prices and job accessibility. 
The theory of spatial mismatch (Kain 1968; 
Cutler, Glaeser 1997) first and foremost describes 
the problems connected with the social polarisa-
tion of disadvantaged population in the central 
parts of American cities and their poor accessibil-
ity to jobs in outlying subcentres. In French cities, 
most of jobs remain concentrated in the centre, 
while the most segregated neighbourhoods are 
situated in periphery (Bouzouina 2008). In such 
neighbourhoods, public investments are often tak-
ing place aiming at improving accessibility as well 
as economic and residential attractiveness in order 
to reach social and functional diversity. Transport 
projects are based on two leverages: land use de-
velopment and transport cost reduction by speed 
increase. These gentrification projects can how-
ever have the opposite consequences penalizing 
population in problematic neighbourhoods if the 
positive economic effect of diminishing transport 
cost is weaker then an increase in housing prices. 
This can lead to eviction of the poorest population 
henceforward incapable to pay more for improved 
accessibility. 
In this paper we deal with residential segrega-
tion, accessibility and housing price. We test the 
hypothesis that accessibility is evaluated different-
ly by different income groups. This hypothesis is 
based on the standard monocentric model of resi-
dential bid rent. We study empirically how accessi-
bility is evaluated at housing market in areas with 
different social status. The goal of the paper is to 
contribute to the empirical understanding of acces-
sibility measures as housing price determinants. 
The spatial trend in their evaluation is analysed in 
the Lyon suburbs populated by households mainly 
belonging to different income groups. 
In order to find differences in the impacts of ac-
cessibility on housing prices among income groups 
of population, the following sampling strategy is 
applied. With the intention to study the phenom-
enon in extremely poor and extremely rich areas, 
two extremums are selected geographically. The 
first one includes two of the poorest municipali-
ties, while the second one – two rather prosper-
ous areas. We are limited by the objective data 
constraints. In French urban areas, the poorest 
households live in apartment blocks and thus the 
apartment segment of housing market should be 
analysed for the richest households as well despite 
the fact that a big share of the rich lives in de-
tached houses. Therefore, instead of looking for the 
areas with the highest overall average income, we 
choose the richest municipalities among those with 
representative samples of apartment sales. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as fol-
lows. The next Section is a short literature review. 
Section 3 describes the standard bid-rent functions 
in a monocentric city for two income groups of pop-
ulation: the rich and the poor. The hypothesis that 
accessibility is evaluated differently is empirically 
tested in Section 4, which includes data descrip-
tion and hedonic regression models applying the 
methodologies of geographically weighted and spa-
tial error regressions. The final Section concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
One part of the literature analysing the links be-
tween accessibility and housing price in disadvan-
taged neighbourhoods deals with gentrification is-
sues focusing on the renovation urban policy. In 
the economic literature, the determinants of reno-
vation and land use development can be grouped 
into the three following factors: first, those con-
nected with the economic laws of location result-
ing from the monocentric model, they deal mainly 
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with income, transport cost and housing demand; 
second, housing age and quality; and third, neigh-
bourhood characteristics and population behaviour 
(Helms 2003). The third group confirms the impact 
of accessibility to the centre, especially by public 
transport: “Accessibility to the CBD matters: im-
provement is more likely in areas that are close 
to downtown and well-served by mass transit” 
(Helms 2003: 496). 
In real estate valuation, accessibility issues 
are under close attention at least since the von 
Thünen theory has been elaborated in the first 
half of the 19th century. Accessibility to the city 
centre is in the core of the Alonso (1964) bid-rent 
model. In their residential location choice, house-
holds make a trade-off between housing price and 
transport cost in the bid-rent function represent-
ing maximal land price per unit, which an indi-
vidual is ready to pay in each part of a city. This 
is the principal issue of the standard model of 
urban economics (Alonso 1964; Mills 1967; Muth 
1969). Thus, households can either reside in the 
centre close to employment opportunities or prefer 
peripheral location with more spacious accommo-
dation and pay higher transport cost. The model 
does not propose an analytical solution concerning 
the spatial distribution of population consisting of 
different income groups, but implicitly considers 
that rich population is more sensible to consume 
accommodation that leads to concentration of the 
poor in the centre. 
However, the centre cannot concentrate all 
jobs. Polycentric patterns of modern cities have 
been recognised (McDonald 1987; McMillen, Lester 
2003) and incorporated into hedonic analyses of 
real estate prices and rents (McDonald, McMillen 
1990; McMillen 1996; Sivitanidou 1996). Urban 
form depends on the scale of the analysis; this 
point can be illustrated in the analyzed geograph-
ical context. According to Bouzouina (2008), the 
Lyon urban area is monocentric, with one centre in 
Lyon and Villeurbanne. Kryvobokov (2010) found 
fifteen candidates for service employment subcen-
tres within Lyon and Villeurbanne. 
Wheaton (1977) with the San Francisco data 
demonstrated that there exist substantial differ-
ences among income groups in the value of travel 
time and the demand for land, but these compli-
ment one another to yield bid-price gradients that 
appear quite similar. Also, he found that although 
the value of travel time increases significantly 
with income, it is totally overshadowed by the 
fixed money costs of travel. In France, the hypoth-
esis of identical bid-rent functions has not yet been 
verified (Goffette-Nagot et al. 2000). Not all the 
cities are monocentric (Anas et al. 1998), and the 
strength of housing market is sometimes weaker 
than that of generalised transport cost (Glaeser 
et al. 2008). The distinction between transport cost 
by public transport and by car is central in the 
explication of socio-spatial distribution (LeRoy, 
Sonstelie 1983). 
Ross et al. (2011) have shown the inability to 
fit more than two distance variables into hedonic 
regression model arguing that two points in space 
triangulate the optimal position by fundamental 
geometry. Beside distances “as the crow flies”, net-
work distances and travel times to urban centres, 
integral centrality and accessibility measures are 
applied in hedonic modelling of housing values. 
The centrality concept is an objective one; it takes 
into account the location of opportunities and po-
tential access to them (e.g. Krizek 2005). The ac-
cessibility measure in the interpretation of Thé-
riault et al. (2005, 2007) is subjective one, based 
on trip duration thresholds (Kim, Kwan 2003); it 
is the ease with which persons, living at a given 
location, can move in order to reach activities and 
amenities which they consider as important. 
Thériault et al. (2007) analyse links among mo-
bility, accessibility and housing markets and pay 
attention to perceptual issues, which depend on 
self-valuation of time and ability and willingness 
to pay a premium for better home location. They 
argue that these values, ability and willingness 
related to specific constraints define a utility func-
tions, which are somewhat different for each house-
hold and are likely to differ among social groups. 
Moreover, Thériault and colleagues speculate that 
it could be argued that in modern cities, social gra-
dients are progressively prevailing over access fac-
tors as major price determinants. Thériault et al. 
(2007) calculate accessibility indexes for men and 
woman and find significant differences in central-
ity and accessibility estimates among house types 
in hedonic models. In our study we do not calculate 
different measures for population groups, but fo-
cus on differences in price premiums for the same 
attributes among different groups and locations. 
3. THE STANDARD MONOCENTRIC CITY 
MODEL FOR TWO INCOME GROUPS
The monocentric city model has been proposed 
by Alonso (1964) and generalized in many ways 
by Mills (1967), Muth (1969) and Fujita (1989). A 
comprehensive overview can be found e.g. in Anas 
et al. (1998).
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While we deal with two income groups of house-
holds and with apartments, the following desig-
nations for the standard bid-rent model are used 
hereafter:
 – zr, zp – composite goods representing all con-
sumer goods except housing and transport 
for the rich and the poor respectively;
 – Ar, Ap – apartment floor area for the two in-
come groups;
 – ur(zr, Ar), up(zp, Ap) – utilities from a compos-
ite good and apartment floor area for the two 
income groups;
 – Tr(x), Tp(x) – transport costs, which include 
the value of travel time, for households living 
x units from the CBD and belonging to the 
two income groups;
 – Wr, Wp – exogenous incomes of households 
belonging to the two income groups.
Each household has an income, which covers 
its expenditures on the composite good, transport 
and apartment rent. The residential bid rent at 
location x is the maximum rent per floor area unit 
that a rich or a poor household is able to pay and 
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where: ⋅[ ]rA , ⋅[ ]pA  are the solutions to the maximi-
sation in (1). For brevity, the square brackets are 
not used hereafter. The ratio of the slopes of the 
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Transport cost for the rich and the poor can 
be the same. It means that they not only use the 
same amount of gasoline per distance unit for their 
cars or the same tickets for public transport, but 
also evaluate their time, comfort, safety, etc. in the 
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or the ratio of the bid-rent functions of the two 
income groups is inversely proportional to their 
apartment floor areas, which are the maximisation 
solutions. When >r pA A , i.e. the rich have larger 
apartments: 
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be less than unity if the additional transport cost 
for the rich located a small additional distance dx 
from the CBD is lower than for the poor. If both 
conditions >r pA A  and ′ ′<( ) ( )r pT x T x  take place, 
the inequality (5) is true again. 
We should note that both assumptions contra-
dict a standard view that the value of travel time 
increases with income. However, it is not always 
easy to grasp the difference in its evaluation by 
income groups. First, it can be overshadowed by 
fixed travel costs (Wheaton 1977). Second, differ-
ent car-ownership rates for social groups (Korsu, 
Wenglenski 2010) and thus different modes of 
travel can lead to shorter travel times for the rich. 
What is probably more important is that location 
amenities (which are not only the proximity to the 
CBD) not presented in the aforementioned model 
can outweigh the travel time component of the lo-
cation choice of high-income households.
Thus, ignoring location amenities and assum-
ing that the rich prefer larger apartments and 
either the transport cost for both income groups 
are the same or the marginal transport cost for 
the rich is lower than for the poor, the bid-rent 
gradient for the rich is lower. In other words, un-
der the mentioned conditions, with each additional 
distance unit from the CBD the bid-rent for the 
rich decreases slower than for the poor. It is worth 
to repeat again that in this simple derivation the 
difference among income groups is mainly mani-
fested in apartment floor area units, while the 
categories of geographical peculiarities, prestige, 
racial composition, etc. are ignored. We will deal 
with some of them in the empirical exercise in the 
next Section. 
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4. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
4.1. The study area and data
The Lyon metropolitan area is the second largest 
by population in France. In 2005, its population 
counted about 1.75 million inhabitants. The cen-
tre of the agglomeration is formed by the adjacent 
cities of Lyon and Villeurbanne (Fig. 1) with total 
population of more than 600 thousand inhabitants. 
In the Lyon agglomeration, the share of car in 
mode choice composes 66.0%, while those of public 
transport 12.6% (Mignot et al. 2009). The rich and 
the poor households in this study are determined 
as occupying the highest 20% and the lowest 20% 
in the income range respectively. According to the 
household travel survey conducted in the agglom-
eration in 2006, the rich and the poor have the 
same number of home-to-shop trips per person, 
and trip duration is only 4% lower for the poor. 
The maximum difference between the poor and the 
rich for trip duration is observed for home-to-work 
trips, and it is only 7%. 
It is a well-known phenomenon that western 
suburbs of Lyon are prosperous, while eastern 
ones are poor. The selected four municipalities are 
Sainte-Foy-lès-Lyons and Oullins in the west and 
Vénissieux, and Vaulx-en-Velin in the east (Fig. 1). 
All these municipalities are located in the Greater 
Lyon, or the first ring of suburbs, and experienced 
quite similar general demographic trends: positive 
dynamics till the 1980s, slight fall in the 1980s and 
1990s (which was sharper in Vaulx-en-Velin and 
Vénissieux) and modest increase in recent years. 
In the poor eastern suburbs, where the popu-
lation is mainly formed by immigrants and their 
descendants, ethnic dimension overlays with socio-
economic one (Fitoussi et al. 2004), but it plays an 
important role in the perception of the area includ-
ing the stigmatisation process. According to the 
last census in 1999, in the eastern Lyon banlieues 
the share of foreign nationals reached 22%, while 
in some rich neighbourhoods in more western loca-
tions it composed only 3%. The analysis of the de-
mographic evolution of foreigners in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods and their residential migration 
demonstrates the behaviour patterns, which are 
similar to the population average. Foreigners leave 
or avoid these neighbourhoods as well as French 
nationals, despite difficulties of relocation specific 
to them. This “all run” reality (Pan Ké Shon 2009), 
which is seldom demonstrated explicitly, according 
to Bouzouina (2008) confirms the socio-economic 
dominance in the segregation process. 
Table 1 contains the statistical description of 
the four municipalities. The demographic data is 
referred to 2005, the employment to 2006, and 
car-ownership rates and incomes to 1999. In the 
eastern banlieues, especially in Vaulx-en-Velin, 
the average number of persons in household is 
higher and car-ownership ratio is lower. Lower 
percentages of high-income households and much 
higher percentages of low-income population live 
in the eastern suburbs (note that in 2008, by aver-
age household income Vaulx-en-Velin occupied the 
31286th place among 31604 French municipalities 
with more than 50 households). The most visible 
contrast however is highlighted by the two indica-
tors of social insecurity: unemployment rate among 
active population and the percentage of households 
living in social housing. The unemployment rate 
in Vaulx-en-Velin is three times higher than in 
Sainte-Foy-lès-Lyons. 
According to legislation, municipalities in 
France are obliged to have not less than 20% of 
their housing stock social. In fact, almost the same 
percentage of households lives in social housing. 
Based on several sources, Bouzouina (2009) and 
Pan Ké Shon (2010) argue that implementing this 
policy, decision-makers in France can reserve the 
least-desirable accommodations for the poor and 
immigrants and thus contribute to segregation. Fig. 1. The four suburbs and apartment sales
Boundaries of Lyon and Villeurbanne
4 municipalities
Boundaries of zones in 4 municipalities
Urban centres
Apartment sales
0  0.5 1          2 Kilometers
N
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The described four suburbs are the examples of 
the uneven distribution of social housing stock. In 
the western suburbs, this percentage is lower than 
0.20, especially in Sainte-Foy-lès-Lyons, while in 
the eastern banlieues half of population lives in 
social housing (Table 1). 
Income disparities and social contrasts between 
the selected suburbs clearly demonstrate that in 
terms of attractiveness and prestige, “bourgeois” 
western areas are far surpassing their eastern 
counterparts. Moreover, both Vaulx-en-Velin and 
Vénissieux have an image of well-known high-
poverty banlieues. The following quotation from 
Korsu and Wenglenski (2010) about the public 
view of problematic areas in general can be ex-
ploited to describe both: “many people associate 
such neighbourhoods with violence, criminality, 
unwillingness to work, alcohol and drug addiction, 
etc.” (ibid: 2285).
In respect to public transport, the socialist gov-
ernance of the Lyon agglomeration tries to favour 
eastern suburbs. The most expensive investments 
in public transport, such as the extensions of met-
ro and tramway lines, take place to the east from 
Lyon, including Vénissieux and Vaulx-en-Velin, 
while in the western suburbs these types of pub-
lic transports do not exist. In the eyes of many 
Lyonnais, the relative underdevelopment of public 
transport in western suburbs is to same degree 
a deliberate policy supporting their higher stand-
ing. A good illustration of the Not-In-My-BackYard 
principle of the wealthy population is their protest 
(though unsuccessful) in the 1990s against prolon-
gation of the metro line directly linking Vénissieux 
with north-western Lyon. 
We use the data on about 10,000 apartment 
sales selected randomly from all sales in the cen-
tral part of the Lyon metropolitan area in the 
period 1997–2008. These data on sale prices and 
apartment attributes were provided by Perval, who 
collects information about real estate transactions 
in France. After deleting observations with incom-
plete data, 4,362 apartments remained. The defini-
tion of variables and descriptive statistics are given 
in Table 2. It contains information about transac-
tions, as well as on apartment attributes and loca-
tion attributes. It does not include the number of 
rooms, because the cardinal discrete variables for 
them are highly correlated with apartment area 
and are not significant if included in the hedonic 
model. Many observations contain no data about 
the number of parking places, number of cellars, 
and quality of view; therefore the specific dummy 
variables are created. In the sample, 28% of the 
apartments were new, sold in a primary market. 
The location variables in Table 2 include the 
percentages of high-, middle-, and low-income 
households, and dummies for location in one of 
four ad hoc districts. The four ad hoc districts are 
quite large, but relatively homogenous territories, 
divided by water frontiers and the boundaries of 
the urbanised area. District 1 includes the most 
central part of Lyon between the Rhône and the 
Saône. District 2 is an urbanised area on the left 
bank of the Rhône. District 3 is an urbanised area 
on the right bank of the Saône. District 4 is the 
less urbanised territory. 
Table 2 contains the following accessibility 
measures: travel times by car, travel times by pub-
lic transport, tertiary employment centrality index, 
and tertiary employment accessibility index. The 
origin-destination (O-D) matrix of travel times is 
estimated for morning peak with the MOSART 
transportation model developed with the VISUM 
software (Bonnafous et al. 2011). It is a four-step 
model, which forecasts transportation demand. We 
account for the travel times to the Lyon City Hall 
and to Bellecour, which is the main public transport 
junction located in the central part of Lyon. Both 
City Hall and Bellecour are among the fifteen (sub)
centres identified with a regression of service em-
ployment density on travel time (Kryvobokov 2010), 
Table 1. Socio-demographic description of the four suburbs
Attribute Sainte-Foy-lès-Lyons Oullins Vénissieux Vaulx-en-Velin
Population 22,616 26,426 57,566 40,241
Households 9,208 12,032 21,965 14,293
Persons in household 2.46 2.20 2.62 2.82
Cars to households ratio 1.25 1.01 0.95 0.87
Cars to population ratio 0.51 0.45 0.37 0.31
Percentage of high-income households 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.10
Percentage of low-income households 0.21 0.25 0.33 0.37
Percentage unemployed 0.07 0.09 0.18 0.21
Percentage of households in social housing 0.07 0.15 0.50 0.51
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similarly to McDonald and Prather (1994). The cen-
trality and accessibility indexes are integral meas-
ures, which take account of tertiary employment. 
The former is gravity-based and the latter is a “sub-
jective” measure based on satisfaction thresholds 
and fuzzy logic, for details see Appendix 1. Note 
that in Table 2 the geographical unit of analysis is 
not municipality, but smaller zone; that is why the 
percentages of income groups are lower and higher 
in comparison with Table 1, which represents mu-
nicipalities. The zones are French statistical units 
IRISes (Îlots Regroupés pour l’Information Statis-
tique) close to the tracts in the US.
Of this sample, we select four sub-samples from 
the analysed municipalities (Table 3). The average 
floor area is the highest in Sainte-Foy-lès-Lyons. 
Though this attribute is the lowest in Oullins, it 
becomes the second highest there if calculated 
per person using the average number of persons 
in household in municipality. According to the 
average price per square meter, Sainte-Foy-lès-
Lyons is again the leader. The minimum prices 
in the western suburbs are much higher than in 
the eastern ones, but relatively high average price 
and very high maximum in Vénissieux indicates 
a wide diversity of its housing stock. According to 
the t-test, Vaulx-en-Velin and Vénissieux, unlike 
western suburbs, have equal means for some at-
tributes, e.g. the percentage of low-income house-
holds.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of apartment attributes
Variable Description Mean Minimum Maximum Std. deviation
Price Transaction price, Euro 122,507.50 10,965 1,120,000 77,200
Year97-Year08 Dummies for year of transaction 0.04-0.13 0 1 0.20-0.34
Area Apartment area, square metres 68.94 8 301 28.12
Bath1-Bath3 Dummies for number of bathrooms <0.01–0.93 0 1 0.05–0.25
ParkUn Dummy for cases with no data  
about parking places
0.26 0 1 0.44
Park0-Park3 Dummies for number of parking places <0.01–0.49 0 1 0.06–0.50
FloorGr Dummy for ground floor 0.13 0 1 0.33
Floor1 Dummy for storey 1 0.18 0 1 0.39
Floor2_4 Dummy for storey 2 to 4 0.49 0 1 0.50
Floor5_8 Dummy for storey 5 to 8 0.18 0 1 0.38
Floor9+ Dummy for storey 9 or more 0.02 0 1 0.14
Constr<1850-
Constr1992<
Dummies for period of construction 0.03–0.34 0 1 0.17–0.47
CondGood Dummy for good state 0.81 0 1 0.39
CondMed Dummy for state when some  
maintenance is needed
0.16 0 1 0.37
CondBad Dummy for state when renovation  
is needed
0.03 0 1 0.17
ViewNo Dummy for cases with no data  
about view
0.60 0 1 0.49
ViewGood Dummy for view increasing value 0.38 0 1 0.48
ViewBad Dummy for view decreasing value 0.02 0 1 0.13
Cellar0-Cellar2 Dummies for number of cellars 0.02–0.66 0 1 0.13–0.47
Garden Dummy for existence of garden 0.05 0 1 0.22
Terrace Dummy for existence of terrace 0.09 0 1 0.29
NewApartment Dummy for new apartment 0.28 0 1 0.45
%HighIncome Percentage of high-income households 12.55 4.34 28.77 2.91
%MidIncome Percentage of middle-income households 57.96 42.70 66.20 3.30
%LowIncome Percentage of low-income households 29.49 10.24 52.12 5.78
District1-District4 Dummies for location in districts 0.01–0.64 0 1 0.12–0.48
TTBellecour, 
TTCityHall 
Travel time to Bellecour, travel time  
to City Hall in minutes
11.00–21.73 0.55 29.32–51.02 4.99–11.16
Centrality Index Centrality index 37.04–42.13 12.15–13.45 100.00 15.68–17.23
Accessibility Index Accessibility index 63.07–64.70 0.34–0.65 100.00 25.63–27.47
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Table 3 gives the average values of accessibility 
measures in the four municipalities. The eastern 
suburbs are located in general a bit farther from 
the two urban centres, but their indexes for public 
transport are higher at the expense of better devel-
oped network. The number of zones in Sainte-Foy-
lès-Lyons, Oullins, Vaulx-en-Velin and Vénissieux 
are 10, 11, 18 and 24 respectively (see Fig. 1).
Besides using the sample of 4,362 observations, 
we extract the 20% most expensive apartments as 
well as the 20% cheapest apartments assuming 
that their buyers belong rather to the rich and 
the poor households respectively. These sub-sam-
ples called hereafter “expensive” and “cheap” are 
used in further analyses as proxies for the non-
geographical submarkets for the rich and the poor, 
because it is difficult to find information about 
the income of the buyers of particular apartments 
in quantity sufficient to create a mass valuation 
model. For these two sub-samples the equality of 
means hypothesis is rejected for price, floor area, 
income levels and all accessibility measures. We 
admit that this division does not correspond to 
the rich and the poor household groups described 
above. 
Furthermore, this sampling can be biased as 
some share of expensive apartments could be ex-
pensive just because of their large floor area, but 
cheap in respect to area unit. Some observations in 
the cheap segment, on the contrary, can be cheap 
due to small floor area, but have high price per 
area unit. In the context of the study, however, 
it is logical to assume that the poor are not able 
to buy expensive apartments even if their prices 
per area unit are low; while the rich prefer rather 
bigger accommodations. Therefore we suppose that 
our sampling strategy is less biased than it could 
be if it was based on price per square meter. 
Correlation of apartment price per square me-
ter (deflated to the initial year 1997) with acces-
sibility measures are in line with our hypothesis: 
prices of more expensive apartments are less cor-
related with accessibility. If to consider the sales 
in Sainte-Foy-lès-Lyons and Vénissieux, their cor-
relations behave similarly to the expensive and 
cheap sub-samples respectively. In Oullins and 
Vaulx-en-Velin, the sign of correlation coefficient 
is unstable. To understand the nature of these 
anomalies, econometric analysis is needed. 
4.2. Hedonic regression
Applying the hedonic regression model of price as 
the dependent variable with willingness to pay for 
different attributes as independent variables, we 
continue the tradition proposed by Rosen (1974). If 
the supply of each characteristic is perfectly elas-
tic, hedonic coefficients reveal demand for charac-
teristics, though in most real-world contexts such 
a stringent maintained hypothesis is untenable 
(Malpezzi 2003). Hedonic price model is widely 
used in real estate research. The recent examples 
of its application to housing prices in France are 
Table 3. Apartment sales and accessibility in the four suburbs
Attribute Sainte-Foy-lès-Lyons Oullins Vénissieux Vaulx-en-Velin
Apartment sales
Number of sales 84 100 97 54
Average floor area, m2 79 63 67 65
Average floor area per average 
number of persons, m2
32.1 28.6 25.6 22.9
Average price per m2, Euro 1,611 1,495 1,464 1,171
Minimum price per m2, Euro 675 393 226 307
Maximum price per m2, Euro 3,548 3,442 3,674 2,631
Accessibility by car
TTBellecour, minutes 12.17 10.62 14.45 21.13
TTCityHall, minutes 14.67 14.46 17.61 17.93
Centrality Index 23.82 25.61 26.02 23.73
Accessibility Index 28.20 33.94 30.77 23.10
Accessibility by public transport
TTBellecour, minutes 28.61 29.42 29.73 35.41
TTCityHall, minutes 31.48 33.33 35.08 32.69
Centrality Index 20.84 20.03 23.13 21.74
Accessibility Index 31.65 27.44 38.72 35.48
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Gouriéroux and Lafarrère (2009) and Baltagi and 
Bresson (2011).
There is no strong theoretical basis for substan-
tiating the correct functional form of a hedonic re-
gression (Halvorsen, Pollakowski 1981; Malpezzi 
2003), but empirical tests found that the log-linear 
form has a number of advantages over the linear one 
(see e.g. Follain, Malpezzi 1980). More general and 
flexible form was proposed by Box and Cox (1964), 
but this function is beyond our current study. 
In our specification, the dependent variable is 
the logarithm of Price. Among the independent 
variables described in Table 2, the logarithmic 
transformations of Area, %MidIncome, %High-
Income and travel times are used. The following 
attributes are the default values: Year97, Bath1, 
Park0, FloorGr, Constr1981_1991, CondGood, 
ViewGood, Cellar0 and District1. 
First, an overall Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
model is built with 4,362 observations. Separate 
OLS models are created for the expensive and 
cheap apartment price segments; according to the 
t-test of equality of means of regressors, the null 
hypothesis is rejected for the majority of variables, 
including accessibility attributes and apartment 
floor area.
The observations from each of the four selected 
suburbs are exploited with separate OLS and Spa-
tial Error models. In the latter, the error term is 
a function of the residuals in neighbouring areas. 
The geographically weighted regression method-
ology (GWR) is applied to all available sales to 
solve a regression equation in each observation 
point. For the OLS, a weighted standard error 
test (Schnare, Struyk 1976) shows that the four 
submarkets significantly reduce standard error 
in comparison with the pool model. The t-tests of 
equality of regression coefficients in the four sub-
markets give the following results: for accessibility 
measures, the null hypothesis is rejected in most 
cases, while for some other attributes, e.g. floor 
area, the coefficients are rather stable. 
Each model is run eight times to examine the 
willingness to pay for each of the accessibility at-
tributes in question, i.e. travel times to two urban 
centres and centrality and accessibility indexes, 
while each attribute is measured twice: for car and 
for public transport. Our hypothesis is that the 
richer population evaluates travel time to city cen-
tres differently from the poor. We examine as well 
if this is true in respect to the integral indexes. 
Under the conditions mentioned in Section 2, the 
absolute value of the estimate for the accessibility 
in the hedonic price model should be lower for the 
rich than for the poor. 
Table 4 represents the estimated hedonic coeffi-
cients as well as model fit for OLS and GWR mod-
els. For the OLS models, the maximum variance 
inflationary factor (VIF) is also reported. All the 
significant coefficients of the models with TTBelle-
cour by car are presented in Appendix 2, where the 
estimates of the expensive and cheap sub-samples 
and median GWR results are reported as well. 
The three OLS models support our hypothesis. 
In the expensive segment, the absolute values of 
the estimates are always lower (often more than 
twice) than those in the overall model. In the cheap 
segment, the absolute values of the accessibility 
coefficients are always higher than those in the 
expensive segment. The negative effect of increase 
in travel time to Bellecour by public transport by 
1% leads to price reduction in the cheap segment 
by 0.17%, which is 2.8 times more than the price 
reduction in the expensive segment. 
The four municipalities can also be analysed 
as submarkets, for which individual models are 
created. The same variables except construction 
years and some structural dummies are used in 
the OLS and Spatial Error (with a threshold dis-
tance weighting scheme) models for the submar-
kets. The Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests, applied 
for the OLS models, indicate high significance level 
of spatial errors in each of the four suburbs. The 
LM tests of the spatial lags are significant in Oul-
lins and Vaulx-en-Velin, but due to difficulty in 
estimates interpretation, Spatial Lag model is not 
applied in this study. The estimates for the ac-
cessibility measures are presented in Appendix 3. 
However, this approach is rather useful to study 
the willingness to pay for accessibility measures 
within submarkets than the differences between 
them. Indeed, the estimates are insignificant and 
have “wrong” signs in Oullins and Vaulx-en-Velin, 
where the observations are less dispersed spatially 
than in Sainte-Foy-lès-Lyons and Vénissieux. The 
metro station in Vaulx-en-Velin opened in Octo-
ber 2007, by the end of the study period, and this 
fact can contribute to the “wrong” signs of acces-
sibility variables. The effect of the new station on 
the price dynamics is however beyond the current 
study limits. In Sainte-Foy-lès-Lyons, the coeffi-
cients have “right” signs, but they are insignifi-
cant in most cases. The most intuitive results in 
Vénissieux with its dispersed observations are ob-
tained with the OLS technique, but when spatial 
effect is accounted for, the accessibility measures 
calculated for car lose significance. Thus, within 
Vénissieux public transport has more impact on 
housing prices. 
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Concerning the geographically weighted results 
in Table 4, the average estimates among all the 
observations are reported as well as the four ex-
tractions from the examined suburbs taken from 
the overall GWR models. The absolute values of 
the average GWR estimates, which are a bit lower 
than the OLS results, increase from municipality 
to municipality in the sequence presented in Table 
4. The only exception is that for the accessibility 
index for car in Oullins, whose coefficient is signifi-
cant for only 56% of observations. In the eastern 
suburbs, the percentage of significant cases is al-
ways higher than 0.90. Vaulx-en-Velin, where this 
percentage is always equal to unity, demonstrates 
the biggest difference from Sainte-Foy-lès-Lyons. 
The ratio of their coefficients is 5.7 for the travel 
time to Bellecour by car. The absolute values of the 
estimates for the western suburbs are, as a rule, 
lower than the GWR average, though Oullins is 
an exception in the three cases of public transport 
(travel times to Bellecour, City Hall and centrality 
index), which can be explained by relative under-
development of public transport at the time, for 
which the data have been collected. In the eastern 
suburbs, the absolute values of the accessibility es-
timates are almost always higher than the overall 
GWR averages. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
The monocentric-based hypothesis that willingness 
to pay for better accessibility for the poor is higher 
than for the rich is empirically supported with a 
hedonic model of apartment prices. Monocentric 
models with travel times to two versions of city 
centre are supplemented with integral centrality 
and accessibility indexes. The results of hedonic 
models with different accessibility measures are 
quite similar. First, the hypothesis is supported 
with the cheap and expensive apartment segments. 
Table 4. Estimates for the accessibility measures 
Model (OLS),  
extraction (GWR)
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Notes: * – significance level is in the parentheses; ** – percentage of cases significant at the 5% level is in the paren-
theses.
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Second, the support is shown with the example of 
the suburbs representing the patterns of residen-
tial segregation: the inhabitants of poor suburbs 
are willing to pay several times more for the acces-
sibility components of apartment price. Moreover, 
spatial differences in perception of accessibility are 
much higher than those between the expensive 
and cheap non-geographical apartment segments.
The spatial dispersion of observations in the 
examined four sub-samples is important, when 
the attributes within sub-sample are examined. 
Within one poor suburb, accessibility measures are 
found significant for public transport, but not for 
car. The GWR methodology allows comparing the 
effect between sub-samples in the overall model. 
In the selected eastern Lyon suburbs we have 
not found, in general, poorer accessibility, espe-
cially when public transport is taken into account. 
What is really different is the willingness to pay 
for accessibility: the more socially problematic is 
the area, the higher is the price for better acces-
sibility. This can be connected with lower car-own-
ership rate and other problems of disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. From this viewpoint, the prior-
ity of public transport development in the east-
ern suburbs of Lyon looks reasonable as here its 
positive impact is more significantly capitalised in 
housing prices. Thus, investment in transport in-
frastructure in poor areas, which decreases travel 
time and simultaneously increases housing value, 
can be regarded in terms of economic efficiency 
and not only in those of social justice. 
The standard theoretical model presented in 
the paper does not include location amenities 
other than the proximity to the CBD. Some em-
pirical extension is possible with integral meas-
ures of centrality and accessibility considering 
service employment. In future study, more atten-
tion should be paid to other location amenities and 
their place in the trade-off with accessibility in the 
utility functions of household location choice of so-
cial groups. The techniques of Location Value Re-
sponse Surface and Market Basket Value (McClus-
key et al. 2000; Borst, McCluskey 2007; D’Amato 
2010) can be potentially useful to identify value 
influence centres and to be applied as a stage of 
market segmentation.
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Centrality index  
and accessibility index
A service centrality index for zone i is calculated 
with a simple gravity-like model as an “objective” 












where: Aj – the attraction (service employment 
density) of zone j; ttij – the travel time from zone i 
to zone j; N – the number of zones.
A service accessibility index is a “subjective” 
concept based on the realisation of potential ac-
cess. Calculating this measure, we mainly follow 
the approach of Thériault et al. (2005). We esti-
mate a suitability index applying fuzzy member-
ship and using the 50th percentile and 90th per-
centile satisfaction thresholds from the household 
survey for home-to-shop travel times from the O-D 
matrix. A suitability index Sij for travelling from 
zone i to zone j is calculated as follows:
=1ijS  ∀  ≤ 50ijtt C ,
− 







 ∀  < <50 90ijC tt C ,
= 0ijS  ∀  ≥ 90ijtt C ,
where: ttij – the travel time from zone i to zone 
j; C50 – the 50th percentile of the observed trav-
el time; C90 – the 90th percentile of the observed 
travel time.
The fuzzy membership function of the suitabil-
ity index is graphically explained in Fig. A1.
A service accessibility index for zone i is calcu-







AI S A ,
where: Sij – the suitability index for travelling 
from zone i to zone j; Aj – the attraction of zone j; 
N – the number of zones.
The values CIi and AIi for each zone are di-
vided correspondingly by the maximum values in 
the area and multiplied by 100. 
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APPENDIX 2 





Constant 4.552 (<0.001) 7.186 (<0.001) 6.947 (<0.001) 4.255
TTBellecour –0.224 (<0.001) –0.093 (<0.001) –0.176 (<0.001) –0.136
Year99 0.092 (0.001) 0.090 (0.02) –0.087 (0.26) 0.062
Year00 0.162 (<0.001) 0.157 (<0.001) –0.029 (0.71) 0.136
Year01 0.249 (<0.001) 0.281 (<0.001) 0.204 (0.01) 0.220
Year02 0.310 (<0.001) 0.330 (<0.001) 0.223 (0.004) 0.279
Year03 0.474 (<0.001) 0.485 (<0.001) 0.402 (<0.001) 0.451
Year04 0.633 (<0.001) 0.589 (<0.001) 0.590 (<0.001) 0.611
Year05 0.801 (<0.001) 0.748 (<0.001) 0.749 (<0.001) 0.764
Year06 0.933 (<0.001) .801 (<0.001) 0.912 (<0.001) 0.897
Year07 1.011 (<0.001) 0.900 (<0.001) 1.055 (<0.001) 0.983
Year08 1.003 (<0.001) 0.916 (<0.001) 1.010 (<0.001) 0.963
Area 0.932 (<0.001) 0.690 (<0.001) 0.383 (<0.001) 0.937
Bath2 0.094 (<0.001) 0.046 (0.001) 0.053 (0.78) 0.081
ParkUn 0.092 (<0.001) 0.016 (0.48) 0.043 (0.09) 0.043
Park1 0.154 (<0.001) 0.039 (0.20) 0.090 (0.001) 0.099
Park2 0.193 (<0.001) 0.080 (0.01) 0.067 (0.58) 0.139
Floor1 0.067 (<0.001) 0.027 (0.36) 0.078 (0.01) 0.072
Floor2_4 0.104 (<0.001) 0.038 (0.16) 0.103 (<0.001) 0.118
Floor5_8 0.133 (<0.001) 0.073 (0.01) 0.134 (<0.001) 0.147
Floor9+ 0.132 (<0.001) 0.166 (0.002) 0.194 (0.01) 0.165
Constr1850_1913 –0.092 (<0.001) 0.042 (0.18) –0.119 (0.01) –0.083
Constr1914_1947 –0.082 (<0.001) 0.112 (0.001) –0.110 (0.01) –0.062
Constr1948_1969 –0.153 (<0.001) 0.008 (0.73) –0.122 (0.002) –0.119
Constr1970_1980 –0.123 (<0.001) –0.005 (0.83) –0.088 (0.03) –0.083
Constr1992< 0.099 (<0.001) 0.099 (<0.001) –0.085 (0.12) 0.104
CondMed –0.109 (<0.001) 0.009 (0.63) –0.072 (0.001) –0.107
CondBad –0.215 (<0.001) –0.092 (0.04) –0.197 (<0.001) –0.225
ViewNo –0.040 (<0.001) –0.027 (0.03) –0.017 (0.37) –0.035
ViewBad –0.098 (0.001) <0.001 (0.99) –0.002 (0.96) –0.083
Cellar1 0.099 (0.001) –0.002 (0.88) 0.092 (<0.001) 0.076
Cellar2 0.032 (0.001) 0.001 (0.98) 0.021 (0.84) –0.005
Garden 0.049 (0.02) –0.011 (0.73) 0.101 (0.16) 0.046
Terrace 0.043 (0.01) 0.049 (0.01) 0.037 (0.69) 0.041
NewApartment 0.046 (0.01) –0.067 (0.001) 0.256 (<0.001) 0.047
District2 –0.109 (<0.001) –0.035 (0.01) –0.013 (0.64) –0.053
District3 –0.130 (<0.001) –0.104 (<0.001) 0.021 (0.54) –0.088
District4 –0.229 (<0.001) –0.188 (0.01) 0.093 (0.01) –0.189
%MidIncome 0.671 (<0.001) 0.313 (0.05) 0.558 (0.01) 0.770
%HighIncome 0.136 (<0.001) 0.097 0.029 (0.61) 0.028
Adjusted R2 0.838 0.839 0.705 0.875
N observations 4,362 873 872 4,362
Note: Significance level is in the parentheses.
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OLS and Spatial Error models for sumbarkets
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adj. R2 = 0.78 – 0.85, 



















adj. R2 = 0.66 – 0.68, 


























































































Note: Significance level is in the parentheses.
